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Abstract
Existing Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols address only threshold failures, where
the participating nodes fail independently of each other, each one fails equally likely, and the proto-
col’s guarantees follow from a simple bound on the number of faulty nodes. With the widespread
deployment of Byzantine consensus in blockchains and distributed ledgers today, however, more
sophisticated trust assumptions are needed.
This paper presents the first implementation of BFT consensus with generalized quorums. It
starts from a number of generalized trust structures motivated by practice and explores methods to
specify and implement them efficiently. In particular, it expresses the trust assumption by a mono-
tone Boolean formula (MBF) with threshold operators and by a monotone span program (MSP), a
linear-algebraic model for computation. An implementation of HotStuff BFT consensus using these
quorum systems is described as well and compared to the existing threshold model. Benchmarks
with HotStuff running on up to 40 replicas demonstrate that the MBF specification incurs no signif-
icant slowdown, whereas the MSP expression affects latency and throughput noticeably due to the
involved computations.
1 Introduction
Trust assumptions are a fundamental part of secure distributed computing protocols. On one hand, they
capture the limits of a protocol’s safety properties, thus characterizing the domains in which it may be
deployed safely. But on the other hand, they also impose limits on the potential of the protocol and,
in some sense, the expressiveness and freedom of the parties, thus restricting the domains in which the
protocol will be deployed. Byzantine quorum systems [19] are the key abstraction for capturing the trust
assumptions in distributed protocols where parties may behave maliciously. A Byzantine quorum system
(BQS) is defined as a set of quorums, where a quorum is a set of parties that is sufficient to execute a
particular task. A BQS is closely related with a fail-prone system, which contains the sets of parties that
are tolerated to fail in an execution, through the following intersection property: any two quorums must
intersect in a set of parties that is not expected to fail. Thus, BQS formalize the expected Byzantine
failures and allow reasoning about the resilience of protocols using them.
We refer to a BQS that is allowed to contain arbitrary quorums as a generalized BQS, in contrast to
a threshold BQS that defines quorums only by their cardinality. Generalized BQS have been intensely
explored in the literature [19]. For example, Malkhi et al. [20] study their load and availability, Hirt and
Maurer [13] use a very related notion for secure multiparty computation, Junqueira et al. [14] explore an
equivalent formalization in terms of survivor sets, and Warns et al. [26] introduce a generalized model
that unifies multiple such failure models.
Nevertheless, these works approach generalized BQS mainly from a theoretical perspective. When
considering practical, state-of-the-art distributed protocols with Byzantine faults, especially state-machine
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replication (SMR) protocols in the blockchain space, one notices that threshold BQS are the only occur-
ring trust structure. To name some examples, Aublin et al. [1] present an abstraction of an SMR protocol
and build BFT algorithms as instances of it. Liu et al. [8] introduce cross fault-tolerance (XFT), a model
that provides guarantees of crash fault-tolerance but tolerates a number of Byzantine faults. Buchman
et al. [6] present Tendermint, a consensus protocol based on the classical PBFT [10] algorithm, making
use of a novel gossip primitive. Finally, Yin et al. introduce HotStuff [27], a BFT SMR protocol with
linear communication complexity. Threshold BQS have been researched and well understood in practice,
but consensus using generalized BQS has been unexplored.
Threshold is not enough. However, faults and attacks on the nodes in a system often occur in a coor-
dinated way and exhibit substantial dependencies in practice. Using Werner Vogels’ words [25]: “Many
academics will confess to have made the assumption that failures of component are not correlated. This
absolutely unrealistic assumption will come back to haunt you in real life, where failures frequently are
correlated.”
In this sense, Cachin [7] gives an example of a distributed system where the parties are differentiated
by location and operating system (OS). In this scenario, a vulnerability in an OS may result in all parties
with that OS being exploited or a hostile action could corrupt all parties in a specific location. This
example of a generalized BQS explicitly considers correlations and tolerates more failures than possible
in the threshold model. It highlights the strictly richer trust assumptions we can specify and the resilience
we can gain with protocols based on generalized BQS.
As another motivating example from the field of multiparty computation, Gennaro [12] studies veri-
fiable secret sharing over non-threshold access structures, but using only formulas in disjunctive normal
form to build the access structure. As a future direction he calls for a compact representation of an ac-
cess structure, which would allow any BQS to be expressed, thus leading to more efficient and flexible
MPC protocols. Moreover, Cramer et al. [11] propose MPC protocols over any general trust structure,
assuming that the trust structure allows for MPC at all. They work with generalized linear secret sharing
scheme, which is analogous to our focus on monotone span programs.
An important tool in encoding generalized BQS are monotone span programs [15, 5]. A monotone
span program (MSP) is a linear algebraic model of computation, closely related to other models in
the theory of computation, such as Boolean formulas and branching programs [15]. It is known that
monotone span programs are more powerful than monotone circuits. Babai et al. [2] prove that there
exist functions requiring an exponential-size formula that can be encoded by a linear-size MSP. Monotone
span programs have also been proved equivalent to linear secret-sharing schemes [15, 3] and have been
used to generalize existing threshold schemes in the fields of secret sharing and multiparty computation
(MPC). Cramer et al. [11] provide constructions for general MPC protocols based on the MSP primitive.
Recent work on consensus protocols has started to consider trust models that generalize the tra-
ditional threshold assumption. Flexible Byzantine fault tolerance [18], for instance, considers diverse
quorums where some nodes may choose a different threshold quorum. Asymmetric quorum systems [9]
let each node specify its own quorum system.
Contributions. In this work we focus on generalized BQS and demonstrate the first BFT consensus
protocol with generalized quorums. We describe all components necessary for generalized BQS-based
protocols and investigate different ways to realize them. In particular, we address all the following topics:
Encoding a generalized BQS. We first consider a monotone Boolean formula (MBF) consisting of and,
or, and threshold operators for specifying a BQS. Since monotone span programs are stronger than
monotone Boolean formulas, as mentioned, we also investigate MSP for representing generalized
BQS. We exhibit an algorithm for turning a BQS specification into an MSP. When the BQS is
specified as a monotone formula, the size of the created MSP is linear in its inputs.
Integrating generalized BQS with consensus. For both representations (MBF and MSP), we show al-
gorithms for checking quorum properties and for integrating them with distributed protocols. Com-
paring the implementations we observe that the MBF-based method generally performs better than
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the MSP-based implementation because of the matrix manipulations required by the MSP. This
provides the first unified treatment of the efficiencies of these methods and paves the way for their
practical deployment.
Generalized Byzantine quorum systems. We apply our methods to generalized BQS as described in
the literature. For the M-Grid BQS [20], which arranges n nodes in a square and tolerates O(
√
n)
Byzantine nodes, we construct the corresponding MSP and investigate its properties. We imple-
ment an attribute-defined BQS generalizing the OS and location-based example mentioned before
and represent this as an MBF and as an MSP.
HotStuff consensus with generalized BQS. Last but not least, we address consensus, the central prob-
lem in distributed computing. Applying our approach, we realize consensus with generalized BQS
by building on HotStuff [27], an efficient BFT consensus algorithm. This is the first BFT consen-
sus implementation using a generalized trust assumption. In benchmarks with up to 40 replicas, we
observe that the performance with the MBF representation is comparable to that of the threshold
BQS. Using the same threshold trust structure, the MSP representation shows lower performance.
Related work. The exploration of generalized structures has a long background in the field of secret
sharing. Benaloh and Leichter [4] present the first secret-sharing scheme for arbitrary monotone access
structures. They use monotone Boolean formulas with and, or, and threshold operators to express the
access structure and introduce a recursive secret-sharing construction. Their scheme is efficient for ac-
cess structures that can be expressed with polynomially sized formulas. The MSP model was first used
by Brickell [5] for secret sharing, although not explicitly identified as such. After Karchmer and Wigder-
son [15] formally defined MSP as a model for computation, it has been shown that linear secret-sharing
schemes are equivalent to MSP [3].
Many constructions have been suggested for creating the MSP of a given access structure. Lewko and
Waters [16], in a way similar to Benaloh and Leichter [4], suggested a general algorithm for converting
any monotone Boolean formula to an MSP, that is however inefficient for access structures expressed with
threshold operators. The notion of insertion was introduced in by Martin [21]. Nikov and Nikova [23]
explored constructions for recursively building the MSP for an access structure from existing MSPs for
smaller access structures and presented the definition of insertion used here.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main concepts
and important background. Section 3 presents our techniques for encoding a BQS. In Section 4 we
describe HotStuff consensus algorithm with generalized BQS and prove its consistency and liveness
properties. Section 5 subsequently evaluates an implementation of our generalized BQS methods using
the HotStuff consensus protocol.
2 Preliminaries
Parties and failures. We denote as P = {p1, . . . , pn} the set of all parties in a distributed protocol.
Whenever describing properties of protocols, we consider Byzantine faults, meaning that faulty parties
are allowed to take arbitrary steps, cooperate, and learn the internal state held by any of them. For a
specific execution we denote as B the set of the actually faulty parties.
Definition 1 (Fail-prone system [13]). A fail-prone system F ⊆ 2P is a set of subsets of P such that for
every execution there is one fail-prone set F ∈ F with B ⊆ F . A fail-prone system is maximal, in the
sense that no fail-prone set contains another one.
Definition 2 (Byzantine quorum system [19]). Let F be a fail-prone system. A Byzantine quorum
system (BQS) Q ⊆ 2P is a non-empty set of non-empty subsets of P , such that no set is contained in
another one, where each Q ∈ Q is called a quorum, satisfying the following properties:
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Consistency:
∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q,∀F ∈ F : Q1 ∩Q2 6⊆ F.
Availability:
∀F ∈ F : ∃Q ∈ Q : F ∩Q = ∅.
The definition actually corresponds to a Byzantine dissemination quorum system [19]. When a BQS
is defined only by cardinality, i.e., it includes all the subsets of P of a given size, it is called a threshold
BQS. When a BQS is allowed to contain arbitrary subsets of P it is called a generalized BQS.
Definition 3 (Q3-condition [19, 13]). Let F be a fail-prone system. We say that F satisfies the Q3-
condition whenever
∀F1, F2, F3 ∈ F : P 6⊆ F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3.
For threshold BQS, the Q3-condition is equivalent to the requirement n > 3f . Given a fail-prone
system F , a BQS for F exists if and only if F satisfies the Q3-condition. In particular, if Q3 holds, then
F = {F | F ∈ F} is a BQS, called the canonical BQS of F .
Access structure [4]. A BQS specifies the quorums that are self-sufficient for a particular task. In the
literature on multiparty computation and secret sharing [4, 13, 11], the term monotone access structure is
used more often, whereby the basis of such an access structure is equivalent to our notion of a (minimal)
quorum system, and every quorum is called a (minimal) authorized set. In the following, we will use
BQS and access structure interchangeably and interpret both as the minimal collection of subsets of P
with a certain property (i.e., redefining the access structure to its basis).
Definition 4 (Insertion on access structures [21, 23]). Let A1 and A2 be two monotone access struc-
tures defined on two sets of parties P1 and P2, respectively, and let pz ∈ P1 such that pz 6∈ P2. The
insertion of A2 at pz , written as A1(pz → A2), is the minimal monotone access structure A3 defined on
the set P3 = (P1 \ {pz}) ∪ P2 that satisfies the following: a set A ⊆ P3 is authorized in A3 if and only
if the set A ∩ P1 is authorized in A1 or the set A ∩ P1 together with pz is authorized in A1 and pz is
replaced in A by a set authorized in A2. Formally,
A ∈ A3 ⇔ A ∩ P1 ∈ A1 ∨ ((A ∩ P1) ∪ {pz} ∈ A1 ∧A ∩ P2 ∈ A2) .
Monotone span programs [15]. Monotone span programs (MSP) have been introduced as a linear-
algebraic model of computation. An MSP is a quadruple (M,ρ, e1,P), where M is an m × d matrix
over a finite field K, ρ is a surjective function {1, . . . ,m} → {p1, . . . , pn} that labels each row of M
with a party in P , and e1 is the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Kd, called the target vector. If ri is a row of M
and ρ(i) = pj , pj ∈ P , we say that party pj owns row ri. There is also a function φ : P → 2{1,...,m},
such that φ(pj) is the set of rows owned by party pj . The size of the MSP is the number of its rows m.
For any set A ⊆ P we define MA to be the mA × d matrix obtained from M by keeping only the
rows ri with ρ(i) ∈ A. Let MᵀA denote the transpose of MA and Im(MᵀA) the span of the rows of MA.
We say that the MSP accepts the set A if the rows of MA span e1, i.e. e1 ∈ Im(MᵀA). Equivalently,
there is a recombination vector λA such that λAMA = e1. We say that the MSP rejects A otherwise.
It follows that each MSP accepts exactly one monotone access structure and that each monotone access
structure can be expressed in terms of an MSP [15, 3].
One of the objectives of this work is to construct an MSP that encodes a given BQS, i.e., accepts
exactly its quorums. Thus, when working with MSPs (in Section 3.2), we start from a given BQS (and
an implicit fail-prone system), such that consistency and availability of the BQS are satisfied. We usually
express this in terms of the access structure equivalent to the BQS.
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3 Techniques
3.1 Generalized Byzantine quorum systems encoded as formulas
It is crucial to internally encode the BQS using a data structure that is efficient, able to encode any
possible BQS, and also offering an inexpensive method for checking whether a set is a quorum. In this
section we show how the generalized trust assumptions of the system can be specified by the user in a
structured way and encoded within the protocol as a Boolean formula.
We observe that it is enough to use only the threshold operator Θmk (q1, . . . , qm), which specifies that
any subset of {q1, . . . , qm} with cardinality k is a quorum. Each qi can be a literal, i.e. a party identifier,
or a nested threshold operator. The threshold operator is the generalization of logical conjunction, that
would require all qis to make a quorum, and logical disjunction, that would allow each of them alone to
be a quorum – the first can be obtained for k = m and the second for k = 1. Thus, the threshold operator
is complete, in the sense that it can describe any possible BQS. What is more, the generalized trust
assumptions can be specified in a structured, intuitive, and user-friendly manner by the protocol users in
a standard format like JSON. This is aligned with the way users specify their quorum slices in Stellar
Blockchain [22] using nested threshold operators. We call this nested threshold operator configuration
given by the user a configuration description.
We use the notion of a monotone Boolean formula (MBF), a formula that consists of and, or, and
threshold operators and literals that correspond to parties. An MBF F describes a monotone function
2P → {0, 1} in the following way; when F consists only of a literal, then the value of F on input S ⊆ P
is 1 if and only if F ∈ S; when F is the threshold operator Θmk (q1, . . . , qm), then F (S) is 1 if at least
k of the q1, . . . , qm are recursively evaluated to 1 on input S; and accordingly for the other operators.
We say that an MBF F implements a BQS Q if it returns 1 on input a set A ⊇ Q, for Q ∈ Q, and 0
otherwise.
We use a tree data structure to store a BQS described through an MBF, where the internal nodes
represent an operator, their children are the operands, and the leaves always represent a replica. Clearly,
the size of the tree (defined as the number of nodes) is linear in the configuration description. We employ
Algorithm 1 to evaluate whether a set is considered a quorum in the BQS implemented by a formula F .
The runtime is linear in the size of F , given that the set membership operation returns in constant time.
Algorithm 1 Checking whether set A is a quorum in the BQS implemented by formula F .
1: eval(F,A)
2: if F is a literal then
3: return (F ∈ A)
4: else
5: write F = op(F1, . . . , Fm), where op ∈ {∧,∨,Θ}
6: for each Fi do
7: xi ← eval(Fi, A)
8: return op(x1, . . . , xm)
A layered BQS. An example that highlights a more complex BQS that cannot be specified in the
threshold model is a 2-layered-1-common BQS (2L1C). Let us consider two disjoint sets of parties,
organized in two layers, with k parties A0 . . . Ak−1 on the first and 3k parties B0 . . . B3k−1 on the
second. We may assume that the parties in the first layer are more trusted than those in the second layer.
A quorum consists of a strict 2/3 majority of the parties in the first layer plus, for each party A` of these,
a 2 out-of 4 threshold from the set {B3`, . . . , B3(`+1)}, where indices are modulo 3k. For k ∈ N, the
general formula of the BQS is
Θkd 2k+1
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e
({A` ∧Θ42 ({Bm})}) , for ` ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and m ∈ {3`, . . . , 3(`+ 1) mod 3k}. (1)
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Figure 1. The 2L1C Byzantine quorum system for k = 4. The corresponding MBF is Θ43(A1 ∧
Θ42(B1, B2, B3, B4), A2∧Θ42(B4, B5, B6, B7), A3∧Θ42(B7, B8, B9, B10), A4∧Θ42(B10, B11, B12, B1)).
Figure 2. A configuration description that to specify a 2L1C Byzantine quorum system for k = 4.
Notice that by using the fail-prone system that corresponds to a 2L1C BQS in the canonical way, we
observe that this BQS satisfies the Q3-condition because every fail-prone set contains fewer than k/3
parties from the first layer. Thus, it is indeed a BQS. A 2L1C BQS for k = 4 can be seen in Figure 1.
In Figure 2 we show a configuration file that specifies this BQS – it is actually the file used during the
evaluation.
3.2 Generalized Byzantine quorum systems as monotone span programs
Until now, we considered BQS that can be efficiently encoded using formulas. However, as already dis-
cussed, results in complexity theory suggest that MSPs can be superpolynomially stronger than monotone
formulas. For this reason, we also investigate the capabilities of the MSP as the data structure that en-
codes a BQS. In this section we show how to instantiate an MSP from an MBF and how the MSP can
be used to check for quorums. Later, we evaluate the MSP-based implementation and compare it with
the one based on MBF. We remark, however, that constructing the MSP from an MBF is not the only
option; in case a BQS is more efficiently described by an MSP than by a formula, we could plug the
MSP directly in the protocol and use the same quorum-checking algorithms. Throughout this section,
we formulate all our results in terms of the access structure implied by the given BQS, since we only
focus on the quorums of the BQS and not its other properties.
In line with our previous terminology, we say that an MSPM implements an access structure A if
it accepts exactly the sets in A and their supersets. In the following, letM(k) = (M (k), ρ(k), e(k)1 ,P(k))
be MSPs, where M (k) has dimensions mk × dk, for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We denote the rows of each M (k) as
r
(k)
i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ mk. We also denote the jth column in a row r as r[j], a range of columns j1 to j2 as
r[j1 : j2], a row with ` zero elements as 0`, and the concatenation of two rows r and r′, that is an new
vector of size |r|+ |r′|, whose first elements are r and the last are r′, as r || r′.
Definition 5 (Insertion on MSPs [23]). Let rz be a row ofM (1) owned by pz ∈ P(1) – assuming without
loss of generality it is unique. The insertion of M (2) in row rz of M (1), written asM(1)(rz →M(2)),
is an MSPM(3), where M (3) has rows identical to M (1), except for rz , which is repeated m2 times in
M (3), each time multiplied by the first column of M (2) and with the rest of the columns 2 to d2 of M (2)
appended in the end. The function ρ(3) labels the rows of M (3) with the same owners as ρ(1), except for
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rz . The newly inserted rows are labeled according to ρ(2).
More formally, M (3) is an (m1 +m2 − 1)× (d1 + d2 − 1) matrix with rows
r
(3)
i =

r
(1)
i || 0d2−1 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1
rz ∗ r(2)i−z+1[1] || r(2)i−z+1[2 : d2] z ≤ i ≤ z +m2 − 1
r
(1)
i−m2+1 || 0d2−1 z +m2 ≤ i ≤ m1 +m2 − 1
(2)
and ρ(3) is a surjective function {1, . . . ,m1 +m2 − 1} → (P(1) \ {pz}) ∪ P(2) defined as
ρ(3)(i) =

ρ(1)(i) 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1
ρ(2)(i− z + 1) z ≤ i ≤ z +m2 − 1
ρ(1)(i−m2 + 1) z +m2 ≤ i ≤ m1 +m2 − 1
Lemma 1. [23] If an MSPM(1) implements the access structure A(1), with row rz owned by party pz ,
and an MSPM(2) implements the access structure A(2), then the MSPM(1)(rz →M(2)) implements
the access structure A(1)(pz → A(2)).
Lemma 2. Let Vandermonde-MSP(n, t,P) be defined as the MSP (V (n, t), ρ, e1,P), withP = {p1, . . . , pn},
V (n, t) the n× t Vandermonde matrix over a finite field K,
V (n, t) =

1 x1 x
2
1 · · · xt−11
1 x2 x
2
2 · · · xt−12
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 xn x
2
n · · · xt−1n
 ,
with xi 6= xj 6= 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, ρ a function that maps row ri to party pi, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Kt. Then, Vandermonde-MSP(n, t,P) implements the t out-of n threshold access
structure Θnt (P).
Proof. Let A ⊂ P and MA the matrix consisting of the rows of M owned by the members of A. From
the results of linear algebra, and because xi’s are pairwise different, we know that the rank of MA is
maximal (that is, equal to t, and thus Im(MᵀA) = Kt) if and only if |A| ≥ t. Therefore, M accepts
exactly those sets A with |A| ≥ t.
Building the MSP that implements a generalized BQS. Based on the previous lemmata, we now
present Algorithm 2 that gets as input an access structure, encoded as an MBFF , and outputs an MSP that
implements it. The idea is to start with a Vanderomonde matrix implementing the first in the hierarchy
threshold operator and repeatedly perform insertions of the MSPs implementing the nested threshold
operators.
Algorithm 2 works as follows. Let F = Θmd (F1, . . . , Fm) be an MBF, where each Fi can be a party
or a nested threshold operator. The algorithm first creates the MSP for F (lines 1–13) in the following
way: it extracts the values m, d and F1, . . . , Fm from F (line 2) and examines whether each Fi is a party
literal or a nested operator. In the second case, a fresh virtual party vi is created and associated with Fi
(the map Vmap is used to keep track of this association). A virtual party is treated exactly as an actual
party, except it is used only during this construction. The MSP for F is now created according to Lemma
2 and using both actual and virtual parties as the set P . In the second part of the algorithm (lines 14–17)
the MSPs for the nested operators (virtual parties vi) are recursively created (line 15) and inserted inM,
according to Definition 5. The function φ related to the MSPM, that maps a party to the rows they own,
is used to get the row ri of M that was labeled with vi. Notice that in line 10, a fresh variable is created
for each nested operator, so vi owns a single row.
For the termination of the recursion, notice that, if F does not contain any nested threshold operators,
V is the empty set when we reach line 14, and the algorithm returns. The next result therefore follows
immediately from the definition of insertion and the fact that the algorithm starts with a 1× 1 matrix.
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Algorithm 2 Construction of an MSP from a monotone Boolean formula F .
1: buildMSP(F )
2: let Θmd (F1, . . . , Fm) be the formula F
3: R← ∅
4: V ← ∅
5: Vmap ← ∅
6: for each Fi do
7: if Fi is a literal p then
8: R← R ∪ {p}
9: else
10: declare vi a new virtual party
11: V ← V ∪ {vi}
12: Vmap ← Vmap ∪ {(vi, Fi)}
13: M← Vandermonde-MSP(m, d,R ∪ V )
14: for each vi ∈ V do
15: M2 ← buildMSP(Vmap(vi))
16: ri ← φ(vi)
17: M←M(ri →M2)
18: returnM
Lemma 3. Let F be an MBF that includes in total c operators in the form Θmidi . The matrix M of the
MSP constructed with Algorithm 2 has m =
∑k
1mi − c+ 1 rows and d =
∑k
1 di − c+ 1 columns.
Lemma 3 implies that the resulting matrix M has size linear in the length of F . In the special case
that each party appears only once in the access structure, M has n rows and at most n columns, where
n = |P|.
Checking for quorums. We now show how to determine whether a set constitutes a quorum using the
MSP representation of the system and no other information about the BQS (e.g. whether it is a threshold
or a generalized BQS, or whether it was specified using threshold or other operators).
We have seen that an MSP accepts a set A if and only if the rows of MA span the vector e, or,
equivalently, the linear system MTAx = e has solutions for x. According to linear algebra, a necessary
and sufficient condition for this is that the rank of MTA is equal to the rank of the the augmented matrix
MTA |e. To check this condition, we perform Gaussian elimination on the augmented matrix MTA |e and
bring it in row echelon form. If it contains a row with only zeros in the coefficient part but a nonzero
value in corresponding constant part, then the rank of MTA |e is bigger that the rank of MTA and A is not
an authorized group. Otherwise, A is an authorized group.
Gaussian elimination has a cubic time complexity, so it is expensive to perform it every time we
wish to check for a quorum. As an optimization we use the LUP-decomposition of matrix MT , i.e. we
calculate the d × d matrices P and L, and the d ×m matrix U , such that PMT = LU . Then, for any
set A we get PMTA = LUA, where P and L do not depend on A. In the initialization of the protocol we
solve Ly = Pe for y, where y is a d-vector. Then, instead of the equation MTAx = e we can work with
the equation UAx = y. In order to check whether a set A is authorized, we now have to bring UA|y in
row echelon form. Since UA it is an upper triangular matrix, some computational steps are avoided.
Notice here that it might be the case that A is a superset of an authorized group. These redundant
parties can easily be identified from the echelon form, as they will correspond to the free variables of
the system – variables whose corresponding column does not contain a pivot. Another situation worth to
mention is that a party can own more than one rows of M . However, the algorithm described above also
works in this case, since MA will contain all rows owned parties in A.
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3.3 Concrete constructions of Byzantine quorum systems
We now consider two specific families of generalized BQS that have been studied in the literature and
show how they can be encoded as MSPs.
Attribute-based BQS. Let X = {χ1, . . . , χr} denote a set of attributes and Ψ ⊆ P × X a relation
between parties and attributes. We say that party pj holds an attribute χ whenever (pj , χ) ∈ Ψ. An
attribute-based MBF is a monotone Boolean formula F (χ1, . . . , χr) over the attributes X and imple-
ments a BQS where a set A ⊆ P is a quorum if the set {χ ∈ X | ∃p ∈ A : (p, χ) ∈ Ψ} of the attributes
collectively held by parties in A satisfy F . By adding one more syntactic rule, we can also specify the
requirement that an attribute is held by at least a number of parties. Let each χi ∈ X be related with Li
parties, i.e. {p ∈ P | (p, χi) ∈ Ψ} = Li, and let `i ≤ Li. Then, a formula F (χ(`1)1 , . . . , χ(`r)r ) specifies
that A is a quorum if, in addition to the aforementioned condition, |{p ∈ A | (p, χi) ∈ Ψ}| ≥ `i.
An MSP M = (M,ρ, e1,P) that implements F (χ(`1)1 , . . . , χ(`r)r ) can be constructed as follows.
First, an MSPM′ = (M ′, ρ′, e′1,F) is created for F (χ1, . . . , χr), using the methods presented in the
previous sections. Then an insertion M′(ri → Mi) is performed for every χi, where Mi is an MSP
with Mi the Li × `i Vandermonde matrix and ρi a function labelling the rows of Mi with the parties
related with χi. Notice that the resulting MSPM is defined on the set of parties P and not the set of
attributes X .
We now instantiate this using the attribute-based BQS mentioned earlier. Recall that there are two
families of attributes, location and operating system. We use the attributes {χ11, χ12, χ13, χ14} for the
four different locations and the attributes {χ21, χ22, χ23, χ24} for the four different OS. The 16 parties
are arranged in a four by four grid, so that each party is related with exactly one attribute from each
family. The system tolerates the simultaneous failure of all parties in one location and all parties with a
specific OS. Thus, a set is a quorum if it contains at least three parties with different OS for at least three
different locations. This BQS is implemented by the attribute-based MBF
Θ43
(
χ
(3)
11 , χ
(3)
12 , χ
(3)
13 , χ
(3)
14
)
∧Θ43
(
χ
(3)
21 , χ
(3)
22 , χ
(3)
23 , χ
(3)
24
)
.
Following the method described above, a 4× 3 Vandermonde matrix will be inserted in every χ(3)ij when
creating the MSP, which, according to Lemma 3, will have dimensions 32× 22.
The M-Grid BQS. Malkhi et al. [20] proposed the M-Grid system, a family of BQS where n = k2
parties are arranged in a k×k grid and up to b parties are allowed to be Byzantine, with b ≤ (√n+ 1)/2.
A quorum consists of any
√
b+ 1 rows and
√
b+ 1 columns. Actually, the M-Grid was proposed as a
Byzantine masking quorum system [19], a category of BQS that requires a stronger intersection property
than the Byzantine dissemination quorum systems, but one can adapt the construction accordingly.
For a dissemination BQS, the requirement for b is b ≤ √n−1 and a quorum consists of any√b/2 + 1
rows and
√
b/2 + 1 columns. To see this, notice that if two quorums Q1 and Q2 have a row or a column
in common, then |Q1∩Q2| ≥
√
n ≥ b+1. Otherwise, the intersection ofQ1’s columns withQ2’s rows is
disjoint from the intersection of Q2’s columns with Q1’s rows, so |Q1 ∩Q2| ≥ 2
√
b/2 + 1
√
b/2 + 1 >
b+ 1. In both cases, the consistency property of a BQS is satisfied.
To encode the M-Grid BQS we define the attribute set X = {R1, . . . , Rk, C1, . . . , Ck} and assign
the party sij at row i and column j the attributes Ri and Cj . The attribute-based MBF related to this
BQS family is
Θk√
b/2+1
(
R
(k)
1 , . . . , R
(k)
k
)
∧Θk√
b/2+1
(
C
(k)
1 , . . . , C
(k)
k
)
.
The formula has 3 + 2k threshold operators, considering the and operator as a 2-out-of-2 threshold and
recalling that our method inserts a k × k MSP in the attributes R(k)i and C(k)j . The resulting MSP that
implements the M-Grid BQS has, 2n rows and 2n + 2(
√
b/2 + 1 − k) < 2n columns according to
Lemma 3.
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4 Consensus using generalized quorums systems
HotStuff [27] is an efficient leader-driven Byzantine fault-tolerant state-machine replication (SMR) al-
gorithm in the partially synchronous model. The nodes that take part in the protocol are separated into
replicas, that actually run the protocol, and clients, that submit requests to the replicas and receive totally-
ordered responses. The trust assumptions are specified by the number of replicas n and the number of
tolerated faults f . The replicas maintain a tree structure, whose nodes contain batches of clients’ com-
mands and get committed in a monotonically increasing way. Two nodes conflict if none of them extends
from the other.
HotStuff is presented in three versions, the so-called basic, chained, and implemented HotStuff.
In the first, each view consists of four phases, called prepare, pre-commit, commit, and decide. In
each phase, the leader waits for n − f different vote messages from the replicas, constructs a quorum
certificate (QC) upon receiving them, and starts the next phase by broadcasting this certificate to the
replicas. The view changes in the end of the decide phase, or whenever the replicas time out waiting
for a leader’s message. Each view has a deterministically determined leader. Out of these four phases,
only the first makes progress, in the sense that the leader proposes a new node and the replicas evaluate
the correctness of this proposal. The other three only exist to guard the safety of the protocol. Based on
this remark, the authors pipeline the four phases into one and come up with the chained version. Now
each view consists of a single generic phase, that serves as the prepare phase for the new node, as the
pre-commit phase for the previous block and so on. Again, the leader awaits n− f votes and constructs
the certificate that starts the next view. Finally, the implemented version presents further optimizations,
the most important being the extraction of the liveness mechanism into a module called the pacemaker.
The actual prototype implementation of threshold HotStuff, which we also use for generalized HotStuff,
is based on the implemented version.
The generalized HotStuff protocol is instantiated with a Byzantine quorum system, which specifies
its trust assumptions. The leader now collects votes from a quorum of processes and constructs a QC
by concatenating them. Upon receiving the QC, the replicas validate the signatures, as well as the fact
that the voters indeed form a quorum. Each view can again have a deterministically determined leader,
and a quorum of processes is required to trigger a view change against a faulty leader. The optimizations
mentioned for threshold HotStuff also apply in generalized HotStuff.
The pseudocode of basic HotStuff with generalized BQS is presented in Algorithm 3. We give a
brief description of the data structures used and refer to [27] for more details. A message consists of four
fields, type, viewNumber, node, and justify. The type can be one of NEW-VIEW, PREPARE, PRE-COMMIT,
COMMIT, DECIDE. The viewNumber is always populated with the current view number. The field node
is used in the prepare phase by the leader to propose the new leaf node, as well as by replicas in vote
messages. Finally, justify is always used by the leader to send a valid QC and by the replicas to send their
prepareQC in a NEW-VIEW message. A vote message, sent by replicas, additionally contains a signature
over the fields type, viewNumber, node. The QC data structure consists of four fields, type, viewNumber,
node, and sig. The type can be one of PREPARE, PRE-COMMIT, COMMIT and is used to indicate the
phase in which the votes used to construct the QC were cast. The fields viewNumber and node indicate
the view in which the QC was created and the node it justifies, respectively. Finally, the field sig contains
the signatures on the vote messages of the quorum that was used to construct the QC.
In the pseudocode we omit the details related to the signing and verification of the messages, the
verification of a QC and the signing of the vote messages. We denote as p` the leader of a view. As in the
original protocol, this could be any deterministic function from the view number to the replicas, as long
as it eventually proposes a correct leader. If an interrupt happens when replicas are waiting for a message,
line 43 is executed. The variables new-views, prepare-votes, precommit-votes, and commit-votes, used by
the leader to store the votes until a quorum is received, are emptied in each view (not shown for brevity).
The safety of the HotStuff protocol as presented in [27] is based on the properties of threshold
Byzantine quorum systems, namely the n > 3f condition. In the generalized protocol the safety is
reduced to the properties of the generalized BQS. Generalized and threshold HotStuff satisfy the same
safety and liveness theorems, which we now present and prove for the generalized case.
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Algorithm 3 Basic HotStuff, code for process pi
State prepareQC←⊥; lockedQC←⊥; curView← 1
// PREPARE phase
1: upon receiving a message [NEW-VIEW, viewNumber, node, justify] from pj // only leader p`
2: such that viewNumber = curView− 1 do
3: new-views[j]← justify
4: if exists {pk ∈ P | new-views[k] 6=⊥} ∈ Q then
5: V = {new-views[k] | new-views[k] 6=⊥}; highQC← argmaxv∈V (v.viewNumber)
6: curProposal← new node
7: curProposal.parent← highQC.node; curProposal.cmd← client’s command
8: send message [PREPARE, curView, curProposal, highQC] to all pj ∈ P
9: upon receiving a message [PREPARE, viewNumber, node, justify] from p` such that viewNumber = curView do
10: if node extends from justify.node
11: and (node extends from lockedQC.node
12: or justify.viewNumber > lockedQC.viewNumber) then
13: send vote message [PREPARE, curView, node,⊥] to p`
// PRE-COMMIT phase
14: upon receiving a vote message v = [PREPARE, viewNumber, node, justify] from pj // only leader p`
15: such that viewNumber = curView do
16: prepare-votes[j]← v
17: if exists {pk ∈ P | prepare-votes[k] 6=⊥} ∈ Q then
18: V = {prepare-votes[k] | prepare-votes[k] 6=⊥}; prepareQC← QC (V )
19: send message [PRE-COMMIT, curView,⊥, prepareQC] to all pj ∈ P
20: upon receiving a message [PRE-COMMIT, viewNumber, node, justify] from p`
21: such that viewNumber = curView and justify.type = PREPARE do
22: prepareQC← justify
23: send vote message [PRE-COMMIT, curView, justify.node,⊥] to p`
// COMMIT phase
24: upon receiving a vote message v = [PRE-COMMIT, viewNumber, node, justify] from pj // only leader p`
25: such that viewNumber = curView do
26: precommit-votes[j]← v
27: if exists {pk ∈ P | precommit-votes[k] 6=⊥} ∈ Q then
28: V = {precommit-votes[k] | precommit-votes[k] 6=⊥}; precommitQC← QC (V )
29: send message [COMMIT, curView,⊥, precommitQC] to all pj ∈ P
30: upon receiving a message [COMMIT, viewNumber, node, justify] from p`
31: such that viewNumber = curView and justify.type = PRE-COMMIT do
32: lockedQC← justify
33: send vote message [COMMIT, curView, justify.node,⊥] to p`
// DECIDE phase
34: upon receiving a vote message v = [COMMIT, viewNumber, node, justify] from pj // only leader p`
35: such that viewNumber = curView do
36: commit-votes[j]← v
37: if exists {pk ∈ P | commit-votes[k] 6=⊥} ∈ Q then
38: V = {commit-votes[k] | commit-votes[k] 6=⊥}; commitQC← QC (V )
39: send message [DECIDE, curView,⊥, commitQC] to all pj ∈ P
40: upon receiving a message [DECIDE, viewNumber, node, justify] from p`
41: such that viewNumber = curView and justify.type = COMMIT do
42: output decide (justify.node)
43: send message [NEW-VIEW, curView,⊥, prepareQC] to p`+1
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Theorem 4. If w and b are conflicting nodes, they cannot be both decided, each by a correct replica.
Proof. Let qc1 and qc2 be the valid certificates, with qc1 created with the votes of a quorum Q1 and
qc2 with the votes of a quorum Q2, that convinced the two replicas to decide, that is qc1.type =
COMMIT, qc1.node = w, qc2.type = COMMIT, qc2.node = b. Also, let qc1.viewNumber = v1 and
qc2.viewNumber = v2. First note that v1 and v2 cannot be the same. That would mean that the votes
in Q1 and Q2 were cast in the same view, which would require the replicas in Q1 ∩Q2 to vote twice in
that view. But this is impossible, since algorithm 3 allows replicas to vote only once in the commit phase
Q1 ∩Q2 contains at least on correct replica. W.l.o.g. let v1 < v2 and let v2 be the first view after v1 for
which a conflicting block is decided.
For qc2 to be created, according to algorithm 3 there must first have been a valid prepareQC for node
b. This could have been formed in view v2 or in an earlier. Let vs be the first view after v1 in which a
valid prepareQC qcs was formed. So, qcs.type = PREPARE, qcs.node = b and qcs.viewNumber = vs
and Qs is a quorum of replicas, whose votes where used to create qcs.
Consider now a replica r that voted for qc1 and qcs, i.e. r ∈ Q1∩Qs. During view v1, r must had re-
ceived a valid precommitQC and set it to its lockedQC, with lockedQC.node = w, before casting its vote
for the commitQC qc1. Let us examine now the prepare phase of view vs, in which the leader proposed
the new block b, and specifically the conditions in lines 11 and 12. By the minimality of vs, r was still
locked on lockedQC in that phase. By assumption b andw were conflicting nodes, so the condition in line
11 was FALSE. Moreover, justify.viewNumber was not larger than lockedQC.viewNumber = u1, again
by the minimality of vs, because that would mean that a valid prepareQC was created in a view smaller
than vs. So the condition in line 12 was also FALSE. As a result, every replica in r ∈ Q1 ∩ Qs must be
faulty. But this contradicts the quorum intersection property, thus such qc1 and qc2 cannot exist.
Theorem 5. After GST, there exists a bounded time period Tf such that if all correct replicas remain in
view v during Tf and the leader for view v is correct, then a decision is reached.
Proof. Assume a correct leader that collects NEW-VIEW messages from a quorums Q1 of replicas. Let
qcl be the highest lockedQC among all replicas. There must be at least a quorum Q2 of replicas that
have received (and voted for) a prepareQC qcp that matches qcl. By the quorum intersection property,
Q1∩Q2 contains a non-empty set of non-faulty replicas, through which the leader will learn qcp and use
it as its highQC in the PREPARE message. Since all the correct replicas remain in view v, they will vote
in all the phases and a decision will be reached.
In Appendix A, Algorithm 4 we also show the generalized implemented HotStuff, so as to document
our changes with regard to [27].
5 Evaluation
We have implemented general BQS in HotStuff [27]1. The new functionality has been added in the
form of a C++ library into the existing code base. We use nholmann-json [17] to parse the user-defined
quorum-specification file. We then generate the internal tree data structure and transform it also into
a monotone span program. The extension also contains the functionality for determining whether an
arbitrary set is a quorum, as described in the previous sections. We use Shoup’s NTL [24] for linear
algebra over Zp. As in the original version of HotStuff, our implementation uses secp256k1 for all
signatures. The prototype code does not make use of threshold signatures, instead stores all the received
votes for a block and verifies them independently. We keep the same logic for our generalized quorum
votes.
1We used the prototype implementation available at https://github.com/hot-stuff/libhotstuff.
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Table 1. The evaluated protocols.
BQS implementation in Supported
System replicas clients types of BQS
Counting-HotStuff counting counting threshold
Formula-HotStuff MBF MBF threshold & generalized
MSP-HotStuff MSP MSP threshold & generalized
MSP-Replicas MSP counting threshold & generalized
Setup. In our evaluations, we report on benchmarks with four different versions of HotStuff that differ
in the way how replicas and clients encode quorums. Their features are summarized in Table 1. In the
original HotStuff algorithm (Counting-HotStuff ), replicas and clients know the parameters n and f , the
number of total replicas and failures, respectively, and determine whether they have received messages
from a quorum by counting. In Formula-HotStuff the replicas and the clients are given the Byzantine
quorum system, which can be a threshold or a generalized BQS, encoded as a monotone Boolean formula.
Here we use Algorithm 1 to check for quorums. For MSP-HotStuff, replicas and clients are given an MSP-
encoded BQS, again threshold or generalized, and use the algorithm of Section 3.2 to decide whether a
set of parties is a quorum. According to the standard practice, replicas use batching to amortize various
expensive operations (signatures and potentially Gaussian elimination) over multiple requests. However,
the clients collect responses individually for every single request. This incurs a large cost that is not
part of the replication protocol per se but is due to the way how clients produce requests and check for
quorums. For this reason, we experiment also with a fourth protocol, called MSP-Replicas, where only
the replicas use an MSP. In this setting, the clients are mapped to replicas. Since the replicas receive and
verify batches of requests at once, there is no further need to perform the quorum check on individual
requests.
The evaluation in the original HotStuff paper [27] uses a batch size of 400 because the latency of
batching becomes higher than the cost of cryptographic operations with larger batches. Hence, we run
all our experiments with batch size 400. Finally, we work only with the three-phase HotStuff.
We use VMs on a leading cloud provider, with each replica or client running on a single VM with 16
vCPUs (Intel Xeon Broadwell, 2.6 GHz, or Intel Xeon Skylake, 2.7 GHz), 32 GB RAM, and SSD local
storage. We use a varying number of VMs – up to 40 replicas and 32 clients. All experiments are done
over the LAN inside one data center, with a RTT of less than 1 ms. As this setup eliminates most network
delays, it exposes the overhead added by the generalized BQS code. For the same reason, we use only
zero-sized request and response payloads. In realistic deployments (on a wide-area network and with
significant payload data), the extra cost of generalized quorums would be less visible. All measurements
are made on the client. Finally, the maximum available bandwidth among the VMs was measured by
iperf as 1–2 Gbits per second.
Throughput vs. latency. We first measure throughput and latency in a small system with four replicas,
with the goal of comparing the behavior of the four different quorum-system implementations. We use
a threshold BQS because all four protocols can be instantiated with it, that is, in Counting-HotStuff, this
is specified by two numbers, n = 4 and f = 1, in Formula-HotStuff by the Θ43(P) MBF, and in the last
two protocols by an MSP implementing the Θ43(P) access structure. The reported values were produced
by first fixing the request rate per client and increasing the number of clients from one to eight and then,
with the number of clients fixed at eight, increasing the request rate even further for each of them, until
the system saturates. The result is depicted in Figure 3.
All four protocols exhibit similar behavior. Counting-HotStuff saturates at 188.4K tx/sec, followed
by Formula-HotStuff at 179.3K tx/sec, which is less than 5% lower. The peak throughput of MSP-based
protocols are slightly lower. Specifically, MSP-Replicas delivers 175.5K tx/sec before saturation, which
translates to an overhead of almost 7% compared to Counting-HotStuff, while MSP-HotStuff reaches
roughly 167.8K tx/sec, for an overhead of 11%. The latency at the saturation point is about 11.5ms for
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Figure 3. Throughput vs. latency for 1–8 clients and different implementations of the threshold BQS
with four replicas.
all protocols. We conclude that in a small system like this, with four parties, generalizing a protocol does
not significantly impact its efficiency.
Scalability. In this evaluation we measure the throughput and latency in a system with a varying num-
ber of replicas. We use n = 3f + 1 replicas, for f ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, and a varying number of clients. The
trust assumption is again a threshold quorum system with n replicas, of which up to f may fail, specified
in the appropriate way for each system. For each n we increase the request rate per client and report the
throughput and latency just before saturation. The question we want to answer is how the generalized
protocols (Formula-HotStuff, MSP-HotStuff, MSP-Replicas) scale in comparison to Counting-HotStuff.
The results are shown in Figure 4a (throughput) and Figure 4b (latency).
We notice that Counting-HotStuff and Formula-HotStuff scale up almost identically. In a system
with 31 replicas they achieve a throughput of 80.5K and 78.7K tx/sec, respectively, with latencies of
29.6ms and 26ms. MSP-Replicas achieves throughput and latency very similar to Counting-HotStuff for
low values of n and comparable to Counting-HotStuff for higher n. At n = 13 the throughput of
MSP-Replicas is 9% lower than that of Counting-HotStuff, while the latency is only 4% higher. With
n = 31, throughput and latency of MSP-Replicas lie both approximately 35% behind the numbers for
Counting-HotStuff. We conclude that the overhead added by the MSP-based quorum-checking code is
relatively small for the replicas, considering all the other tasks they have to carry out, such as signature
evaluation and message processing, especially when batching is used. However, the protocol where both
the replicas and the clients use MSPs does not scale so well. This is because clients do not use batching
but operate on the MSP matrix for every received response. Moreover, in the original HotStuff prototype
implementation the clients do not verify the signatures on the response messages at all (!) and, therefore,
this operation is very fast and lets the overhead of the MSP appear large. With signature verification
enabled, as in a production system, additional cost incurred by the MSP representation would be much
less visible.
Scalability with generalized Byzantine quorum systems. We now evaluate the protocols beyond
threshold BQS. The question we want to answer with this benchmark is how they scale when instantiated
with a generalized BQS, in comparison to when instantiated with a threshold BQS. We focus on Formula-
HotStuff and MSP-Replicas, which perform best in the previous experiments, and run them on two
different families of BQS. The first is the 2-layered-1-common generalized BQS presented in Section
3.1, and the second is a threshold BQS. For 2L1C we vary the parameter k from 4 to 10, resulting in
a system with 4k parties, while the threshold BQS is specified by the MBF Θnd 2n+1
3
e (p1, . . . , pn), for
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(a) Throughput (b) Latency
Figure 4. Scalability of the four protocols when instantiated with a threshold BQS.
(a) Throughput (b) Latency
Figure 5. Scalability of Formula-HotStuff and MSP-Replicas when running under two different trust
assumptions, the generalized 2L1C for k = 4, . . . , 10, resulting in 4k parties, and the 2/3 Byzantine
threshold on a set of 4k parties.
n = 4k. We do not consider Counting-HotStuff in this benchmark because it cannot be instantiated with
the generalized BQS.
In Figures 5a and 5b we report the throughput and latency, respectively. In this experiment we run
two replica instances in every VM, so the values reported here are overall lower than in the previous
benchmarks.
The performance of MSP-Replicas when running with the generalized and the threshold quorum
specifications is similar. This is because in both cases the replicas have to perform Gaussian elimination
on matrices of comparable dimensions. Formula-HotStuff also scales in a similar way for both families
of trust assumptions, but this benchmark shows that its efficiency is slightly affected by the specified
BQS. This is, first, because generalized BQS are implemented by longer monotone Boolean formulas,
but also because generalized BQS have a (sometimes much) smaller number of quorums than threshold
BQS, which might affect the leader when waiting for a quorum of votes. It is worth to mention that the
MBF-based protocols perform better than the MSP-based ones also in this benchmark.
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Discussion. Our benchmarks illustrate the added value of generalized BQS and demonstrate that they
have small overhead. One can therefore specify complex, non-threshold trust assumptions in SMR pro-
tocols without significantly sacrificing efficiency. The MBF-based protocol performs consistently better
than the MSP-based, which can be expected due to the higher implementation complexity. The per-
formance of the MBF-based protocol was identical or comparable to the original threshold HotStuff,
although it can be slightly affected by the complexity of the BQS, since more complex trust assumptions
result in longer formulas. The protocol where both the replicas and the clients use the MSP does not scale
well and can only be used in small systems. Nonetheless, in applications where all the nodes participate
in the protocol, i.e., clients are not disjoint from servers, encoding the BQS as an MSP also results in
high efficiency, as was shown by MSP-Replicas in the benchmarks. We anticipate that our work will
pave the way for more protocols generalizing threshold trust assumptions. This can be combined with
the novel ideas presented in the BFT literature, e.g. combination of crash and Byzantine faults [8] or
peer-to-peer gossip [6].
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A Implemented HotStuff
The implemented version of HotStuff using generalized quorums is presented in Algorithm 4. The call
isQuorum(votes[b]) checks whether the replicas in votes[b] constitute a quorum, using our algorithm
described in 3.2. The function getLeader is not defined in HotStuff but is specified by the application.
Procedure onBeat is also called by the leader in order to propose new clients’ commands at points
specified by the application.
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Algorithm 4 Implemented HotStuff, code for process pi
State
prepareQC←⊥; lockedQC←⊥; curView← 1
1: procedure createLeaf (parent, cmd, qc, height)
2: b← new node
3: b.parent← parent; b.cmd← cmd
4: b.justify← qc; b.height← height
5: return b
6: procedure update (b∗)
7: b′′ ← b∗.justify.node; b′ ← b′′.justify.node; b← b′.justify.node
8: updateQCHigh (b∗.justify) //PRE-COMMIT phase on b′′
9: if b′.height > block.height then //COMMIT phase on b′
10: block ← b′
11: if b′′.parent = b′ and b′.parent = b then //DECIDE phase on b
12: onCommit(b)
13: bexec ← b
14: procedure onCommit (b)
15: if bexec.height < b.height then
16: onCommit(b.parent)
17: execute(b.cmd)
18: procedure onReceiveProposal (m = [GENERIC, bnew,⊥])
19: if bnew.height > vheight and (bnew extends block or bnew.justify.node.height > block.height) then
20: vheight← bnew.height
21: send message [GENERIC-VOTE, bnew,⊥] to getLeader()
22: update(bnew)
23: procedure onReceiveVote (m = [GENERIC-VOTE, b,⊥]) from pj
24: votes[b]← votes[b] ∪ {〈j,m.sig〉}
25: if isQuorum(votes[b]) then
26: qc← QC ({vj}kj=1)
27: updateQCHigh(qc)
28: function onPropose
(
bnew, cmd, qchigh
)
29: bnew ← createLeaf
(
bleaf, cmd, qchigh, bleaf.height + 1
)
30: send message [GENERIC, bnew,⊥] to all pj ∈ P
31: return bnew
32: procedure updateQCHigh
(
qc′high
)
33: if qc′high.node.height > qchigh.node.height then
34: qchigh ← qc′high
35: bleaf ← qchigh.node
36: procedure onBeat (cmd)
37: if i = getLeader() then
38: bleaf ← onPropose
(
bleaf, cmd, qchigh
)
39: procedure onNextSyncView (cmd)
40: send message [NEW-VIEW,⊥, qchigh] to getLeader()
41: procedure onReceiveNewView
(
[NEW-VIEW,⊥, qc′high]
)
42: updateQCHigh
(
qc′high
)
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